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WILLS AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES
WILL CONTEST

The case of State ex rel. Cleveland Trust Company v. Probate Court'
constitutes the second act of a drama which commenced with the filing
of a will contest action in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
After the will contest action was filed, and all papers, documents and
transcripts of testimony were transmitted to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court by the Cuyahoga County Probate Court, the contestant
filed an application in probate court to vacate the probate of the will she
was then contesting in common pleas court, on the ground that the

probated instrument was invalid. Such application was made more than
six months after the will was admitted to probate. The executor filed a
motion to dismiss the application to vacate probate of the said will on
the ground that the probate court, after certifying the will and related
papers to common pleas court, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2107.24, was without jurisdiction to entertain an application to vacate
the order of probate of the now contested will. The probate court overruled the motion and set the application for trial. The executor thereafter filed an action for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the judges of
the probate court from hearing and deciding the application to vacate
probate. The judges of the probate court demurred to the petition.
The tone of the court's decision is succinctly capsuled in the statement, found early in its opinion, that "...the applicant has elected her
remedy in the court of common pleas to which the will and all papers
have been certified."' In allowing the writ of prohibition, the court
held that the provisions of sections 2741.01 to 2741.09 of the Ohio Revised Code providing for will contest actions to be filed in common pleas
court, "... . afford the exclusive remedy for challenging the validity of a
will that has been admitted to probate and that a fortiori probate court
is without jurisdiction now to entertain the application.., to vacate the
probate of the will which challenges the validity of the will."' The court
also placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the contestant-applicant consented to the probate of the will in writing, although it does not seem that
the absence of such fact would affect the decision of the court. The
court indicates that its decision is grounded on practical, as well as jurisdictional grounds, since allowing the probate court to hear the application
to vacate probate would result in "... . a precedent.., which would re1.
2.
3.
4.

165 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960), aff'd, 172 Ohio St. 1, 173 N.E.2d 100 (1961).
Hecht v. Cleveland Trust Co., Civil No. 718, 402, C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
165 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
Id. at 674.
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sult in chaos to the orderly procedure of the probate of wills and the
administration of estates by probate court... ."' Counsel amicus curiae
(who in reality were counsel for the contestant-applicant and who received
permission to argue on behalf of her position), asserted that the probate
court has power to determine its own jurisdiction. This argument, said
the court, "... is untenable when the court has patently and obviously
lost jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the action."6
A demurrer was filed to the will contest action filed in the case of
Hauer v. Provident Savings Bank and Trust Company.7 The demurrer
was predicated upon an alleged defect of parties defendant. The lower
court apparently took cognizance of the provisions of the contested will
and concluded that, under the terms of such will, necessary parties had
not been joined as parties defendant within the required period of six
months and, therefore, sustained the demurrer. The reviewing court
reversed, on the grounds that a demurrer may be sustained only where
the alleged defect is apparent on the face of the pleading; and, accordingly, ....

the court would have no right to go to the will... for information... ."8

The heirs, devisees, and legatees of a testator entered into an agreement that, if an action which had been instituted contesting the validity
of testator's will was successful, the estate of the testator would be
divided in a specified manner, different from that provided in the will.
The executor, who had no beneficial interest in the estate other than in
his official position as representative of the estate, was not a party to the
aforesaid agreement. The executor, according to the opinion of the
court in Skelly v. Graybill,9 was "... deliberately not notified..

.""1

of

the time of the trial of the will contest action. The trial resulted in a directed verdict for the contestants, the contestees offering no evidence in
rebuttal to the evidence produced by the contestants. The executor filed
a motion for a new trial and to set aside the judgment, which motion was
granted. The order of the court granting the motion was reversed on the
grounds that a contract such as that entered into by the heirs, devisees and
legatees of the testator is valid in Ohio and not contrary to public
policy. Furthermore, said the court, the executor, having only a representative status, was not a necessary party to such agreement, nor an
5. Id. at 675.
6. Id. at 676. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court,
which confirmed the holding of the appellate court that the probate court lost its jurisdiction upon certifying the will and related papers to the common pleas court. State ex rel.
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Probate Court, 172 Ohio St. 1, 173 N.E.2d 100 (1961).
7. 111 Ohio App. 214, 165 N.E.2d 471 (1959).
8. Id. at 218, 165 N.E.2d at 473.
9. 109 Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218 (1959).
10. Id. at 278, 165 NB.2d at 219.
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"adverse party" entitled to notice of the time of the trial of the will
contest action. The validity of such a compromise agreement is predicated upon the court's view that such a settlement ".. . reduces litigation.... ,,1 Indeed, the encyclopedic reference relied on by the court

as supporting its view of the validity of such agreement, specifically refers
to agreements which are "... . for the purpose of avoiding litigation .... ."'
It is difficult, at least for this writer, to see how litigation has been
avoided by an agreement which provides for a distribution of an estate
in a manner different from that set forth in the testator's will, if a pending will contest action is successful.
RIGHTS OF SURVIVING SPOUSE

The case of Smrtyth v. Cleveland Trust Company13 serves as a reminder of the validity, in Ohio, of the doctrine associated with the
derision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Bolles v. Toledo Trust
Company." In accordance with this doctrine, a widow, who elected to
take under the statutes of descent and distribution, was held, in the Smyth
case, to be entitled to her distributive share of the property held in a
trust which had been created by her husband during his lifetime. The
husband reserved to himself the income of the trust during his life and
retained the right to amend or revoke such trust. Accordingly, the court,
in obedience to the dictates of the Bolles case, held that, as to the widow,
the husband failed "... . to part with dominion and control over the

trust property and this failure to part with dominion and control permits
the wife to assert her right under the statutes of descent and distribution
to a distributive share of the trust res."' 5
ADMINISTRATION

Section 2109.03 of the Ohio Revised Code provides, in substance,
that a fiduciary shall file in the probate court, at the time of his fiduciary
appointment, the name of the attorney, if any, who will represent him
in matters relating to his fiduciary position. This statutory provision
also provides that, if the fiduciary is absent from the state, such attorney
shall be the agent for the fiduciary, upon whom summons, citations, and
notices may be served, by delivering to such attorney duplicate copies
thereof. The court, in the case of Meisner v. Flemion/6 held that the
11. Id. at 283, 165 N.E.2d at 222.
12. Id. at 280, 165 NX.E.2d at 221.
13. 163 N-.E2d 702 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
14. 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
15. 163 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
16. 109 Ohio App. 117, 164 N.E.2d 183 (1958).
section, p. 464 supra.

See also discussion in Civil Procedure
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provisions of section 2109.03 of the Ohio Revised Code authorized service of a summons on a non-resident executor of a local estate, by serving
the attorney designated by the executor in the probate court, although
the action involved was commenced in common pleas court and not
probate court. The court emphasized that the provisions of section
2109.03 authorize service, in the manner therein described, of "Any
summons, citation, or notice.. . ." (Emphasis added.) "Any summons,"
concluded the court, includes a summons issued by a common pleas
court.
The Court of Appeals of Vinton County, in In re Estate of Vickers,"7
considered the question of the discretionary authority of a probate court
in appointing an administrator of an intestate estate. The provisions
of Ohio Revised Code section 2113.06 direct that administration of the
estate of an intestate ". . . shall be granted to persons mentioned in this
section, in the following order... ." In this case, the probate court
appointed, as administrator of the estate, a stranger, not within the
classes mentioned in the aforesaid statutory enactment, over the objections
of a nephew of the decedent who, as a next-of-kin, would be within a
class mentioned in said section 2113.06. The reviewing court reversed
the decision of the probate court, ordered the letters of appointment
originally granted to be revoked and remanded the cause with instructions to determine the competency and suitability of the nephew and to
appoint him as administrator if found qualified. Citing several Ohio
Supreme Court decisions'" to support its decision, the court concluded
that, by virtue of the aforesaid section of the Ohio Revised Code, the
probate court ". . . has no discretionary powers in this matter, but must
appoint an administrator . .. from the class described [in the statute]
if there is a competent person in such preferred class."' 9
The case of Christman v. Christmans° was discussed by the author
last year. In that case, an administrator's brother and sister filed an action
to set aside the administrator's sale of an estate asset to his wife. Such
sale had taken place seventeen years prior to the filing of the action, and
the court thus held the asserted defense of laches to bar the relief sought.
In reaching this decision, the appellate court distinguished an earlier
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court 2 ' on the ground that, under similar
facts, the defense of laches had apparently not been asserted. During the
period covered by this survey, the Christman case reached the Ohio Su17. 110 Ohio App. 499, 170 N.E.2d 85 (1959).
18. Inre Estate of Golembiewski, 146 Ohio St. 551, 67 N.E.2d 328 (1946); Todhunter v.
Stewart, 39 Ohio St. 181 (1883).
19. I re Estate of Vickers, 110 Ohio App. 499, 501, 170 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1959).
20. 160 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). See Aronoff, Wills and Decedents' Estates,
Survey of Ohio Law

21.

-

1959, 11 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 444, 448 (1960).

Magee v. Troutwine, 166 Ohio St. 466, 143 N.E.2d 581 (1957).
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preme Court. 2 The supreme court, in affirming the decision of the
appellate court, accepted and approved the analysis by the appellate
court of the prior decision of the Ohio Supreme Court and, indeed, held
such analysis to be "... apt and conclusive."'
This decision establishes,
quite dearly, that a sale by an administrator to his wife, though voidable
is not void; and, if parties presumptively injured thereby wish to nullify
such a transaction, they must act with reasonable alacrity.
What portions of an estate should bear the brunt of paying debts of
the decedent? In the case of In re Estate of Boughton,4 the executors
proposed to pay estate debts by selling specifically bequeathed personal
property, rather than real estate passing under a residuary clause in the
will. Traditionally, personal property was viewed as the initial fund for
payment of estate debts 5 This preferential treatment of realty is an
anachronistic throw-back to the early feudal concepts of the importance
of landownership. The modern view proclaims that the order of abatement of estate assets to pay debts should conform, as nearly as possible,
to the "intention" of the testator!' Since it is rare that a testator will
provide, in his will, a specific indication of his desires as to abatement,
the determination of his intention becomes, more often than not, the
chore of the court. In this case, the court concluded that the specifically
bequeathed personal property should be preserved at the expense of the
realty passing under the residuary clause, at least until such other assets
have been exhausted. The concern of the court with the testator's intent
is evident in its statement that:
It is quite apparent from the four corners of the will and codicil that
the testatrix was primaiiy 27
concernd with the disposal of her personal
effects. (Emphasis added.)
Ohio Revised Code Sections 2109.50 Et Seq.
A considerable amount of judicial controversy and analysis during
the period covered by this survey flowed from the provisions of Ohio
Revised Code sections 2109.50 et seq. These sections provide, in substance, for the filing of a complaint against a person who is suspected of
being or having been in possession of property belonging to an estate. In
such event, the court is required to cite the person so charged to appear
and be examined regarding the matter of the complaint. The proceedings prescribed by section 2109.50 and the following two sections
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

171 Ohio St. 152, 168 N.E.2d 153 (1960).
Id. at 154, 168 N.E.2d at 155.
163 N.-2d 423 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
57 A.NL JuP. Wills §5 1466, 1467 (1958).
57 AK JUn. Wills 5§1466, 1467 (1958).
163 N.E.2d 423, 424 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
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(2109.51 and 2109.52) are of a summary and inquisitorial character
and are quasi-criminal in nature. The statute calls for a finding of guilty
or not guilty and further provides a ten per cent penalty to be assessed
on the person adjudged guilty in such proceeding, such penalty to be
based on the value of the estate property concealed, embezzled, conveyed
away, or held by such person.
The most troublesome question plaguing the courts has been and
remains the jurisdictional scope of the statutory proceedings above described. The Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Goodrich v.Anderson,"
delineated the boundaries of these special proceedings by saying that
the purpose of the statutes relating to proceedings to discover concealed
or embezzled assets of an estate
...is

not to furnish a substitute for a civil action to recover judgment

for money owing to an administrator or executor, but rather to provide
a speedy and effective method for discovering assets belonging to the
estate and to secure possession of them for the purpose of administration.29
Again, in the case of In re Estate of Black,"0 the Supreme Court of Ohio
found it necessary to state that these special inquisitorial proceedings
could not be used as a device "... . to collect a debt, obtain an accounting
or adjudicate rights under a contract."3 (Emphasis added.)
Two recent decisions, by different Ohio appellate courts, dearly reflect the concern of each court with the judicial limitations which the
Ohio Supreme Court had constructed around sections 2109.50 et seq. In
the case of Smith v.Simpson,"2 the Court of Appeals for Hardin County
was confronted with a complaint under sections 2109.50 et seq. concerning possessory rights to certain securities claimed by the administrator of
the estate of an intestate. The right of possession was dependent on the
validity, enforceability, and construction of several contracts. The court,
relying on the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of In re
Estate of Black,"3 ruled that the proceedings employed could not be used
"... to adjudicate rights under a contract." 4

Accordingly, the decision

of the probate court which purported to so adjudicate such rights was, said
this court, void as being in excess of that court's jurisdiction.
The Franklin County Court of Appeals determined, in the case of
In re Estate of Woods, " that the complaint filed under the provisions of
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

136 Ohio St. 509, 26 N.E.2d 1016 (1940).
Id. at 509, 26 N.E.2d at 1016 (syllabus 1).
145 Ohio St. 405, 62 N.E.2d 90 (1945).
Id. at 405, 62 N.E.2d at 91 (syllabus 5).
111 Ohio App. 36, 170 N.E.2d 433 (1959).
145 Ohio St. 405, 62 N.-2d 90 (1945).
111 Ohio App. 36, 37, 170 N.E.2d 433, 434 (1959).
110 Ohio App. 277, 167 N.E.2d 122 (1959).
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sections 2109.50 et seq. was improper as constituting in reality, a request
for an accounting between the estate and a brother of the decedent or an
attempt to collect, from such brother, a debt owing to the estate. As in
the case of Smith v. Simpson,8 the opinion of the court shows a marked
respect for and analysis of the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court which
established the jurisdictional confines of such statutory proceedings.
The controversy culminating in the case of Fecteau v.Cleveland Trust
Company8 returned the problem of proceedings under sections 2109.50
et seq. to the Ohio Supreme Court. Although presumably aware of the
judicial machinations of the appellate courts in recent cases involving
these proceedings, the supreme court (or at least five of the members
thereof), chose to virtually disregard the obvious and basic questions concerning the statutory provisions involved in the Fecteau case. The complaint stated that certain property belonging to the estate in question was
suspected as being in the possession of defendant. The gist of the complaint was that moneys had been deposited in a bank account in the joint
names of the decedent and defendant, but were so deposited for convenience only and, in reality, were the sole property of the decedent and hence
an asset of his estate. The complaint charged that the defendant withdrew the moneys from the account without authority, at a time when the
decedent was seriously ill and unconscious. The supreme court affirmed
the court of appeals decision in holding that the complaint came within
the scope of the aforesaid statutory sections. In doing so, the court spent
little time on the question of whether the complaint came within the jurisdictional scope of sections 2109.50 et seq., as delineated by past decisions of the supreme court. Rather, the majority of the court seemed to
center attention on the problems involved in determining whether or not
the joint and survivor form of the bank account could be modified by
extrinsic evidence. Justice Herbert dissented from the majority opinion
of five justices (only six justices apparently participated with regard to
this case). He emphasized the prior pronouncements of the supreme
court, pointing out that, contrary to the decision of the supreme court in
the case of In re Estate of Black," "... . the court in this proceeding has
been asked to adjudicate rights under the contract between the decedent
and the bank. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 9 The dissenting justice also
argued that broadening the jurisdictional scope of sections 2109.50 et seq.
will result in increased use of this quasi-criminal procedure in matters not
suited therefor. The dissenting opinion concludes with an objection to
36. 111 Ohio App.36, 170 N.E.2d 433 (1959).
37. 171 Ohio St. 121, 167 N.E.2d 890 (1960).

See also discussion in Contracts section,

p.475 supra.

38. 145 Ohio St. 405, 62 N.E.2d 90 (1945).
39. 171 Ohio St. 121, 130, 167 N.E.2d 890, 896 (1960)

(dissenting opinion.)
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the mandatory penal assessment of ten per cent in a quasi-criminal matter
which requires only a preponderance of evidence "... as contrasted to
that ordinarily required in cases criminal in nature....,
Validity of Prior Gifts
Exceptions to the inventory of assets of the estate were filed in the
case of In re Estate of Roth,4 claiming that certain property held by the
executrix as gifts from the decedent should be inventoried as part of the
estate. Apparently the alleged invalidity of such purported gifts was predicated upon the fact that the decedent was, at the time of making such
gifts, in a weakened physical condition. On the hearing of such exceptions, a certain wire recording was, over objections, offered into evidence.
It contained a recording of a conversation of the decedent with his
attorney and others, disclosing his ". . . clearness of mind in declaring
his unequivocal intention to have the gifts stand as such.... "4 2 The
court held that the recording was admissible since a proper foundation
had been laid to insure the authenticity and reliability of the recording.
The court pointed out that, with proper foundation, a stenographic record would be admissible into evidence and thus, the wire recording should
be admitted, since it "... . might be more reliable than the recollected word
or the translation of notes made by human hand."43 This decision gives
substantial weight to the suggestion that a wire recording be made at the
time of the execution of a will, where there is reason to believe that the
competency of the testator might, after his death, be challenged.
CONSTRUCTION

The testatrix, in the case of Central National Bank v.Cottier," left
a will which was "... . unusual in the meticulous detail of its provisions.""5
The will specified that various numbers of shares of stock owned by the
testatrix were to go to certain specified persons. Stock dividends had
been declared and paid on certain of such bequeathed stocks after the execution of the will and, as a result, the testatrix owned, at the time of her
death, additional shares of such stock. The court indicated that:
...stock

dividends... received after the execution of the will, do not
go to the legatee in the absence of an indication in the will itself or
other relevant circumstances that it was the46intention of the testatrix
that such stock dividends follow the bequest.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 132, 167 N.E.2d at 897 (dissenting opinion.)
170 N.E.2d 313 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
163 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
Id. at 711.
Ibid.
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The additional fact that a stock dividend had been paid prior to the execution of codicils to the will, which codicils did not refer to the bequests
in question, was cited by the court in reaching the conclusion that the
testatrix did not intend the stock dividends to follow and adhere to the
bequests of the stock.
The case of Fifth Third Union Trust Company v. Athenaeum of
Ohio"7 is an interesting case involving construction of testamentary language unique to the situation and parties therein involved. The facts of
the case will not be redted herein, since this writer does not believe any
substantial gain would be derived therefrom. One interesting item which
might be noted in connection with this case is the fact that the court, in
attempting to construe the language of the will in question, sought and
received the opinion of two prominent English language scholars from
Xavier University and the University of Cincinnati on the grammatical
questions involved.
The court, in the case of Brooks v. Eschwege,"8 held that, in the absence of evidence disclosing a contrary intention, the term "stocks" as used
in a will does not include bonds. The court, in bolstering its opinion,
points out that the will was apparently prepared by an attorney and that
this constitutes "... an additional circumstance indicating the language

should be given its legal meaning in determining the testamentary intention." 9
As contrasted with the attorney-drawn will involved in the Brooks
case, the will confronting the court in the case of Park National Bank v.
Dillon50 was apparently drawn by a layman. In this latter will, the descriptive verbs, give, devise, and bequeath were used in each of nine specific bequests without distinguishing, by choice of such verbs, between
gifts of personalty and of realty. A residuary clause ordered the residue
of the estate to be converted into cash and divided equally among "all
devisees hereinbefore named." The court was thus faced with the question of whether the proceeds of the residuary estate should be divided
among the nine beneficiaries named in the will or the three named beneficiaries to whom testator gave, devised, and bequeathed realty. The
court conceded that "...

.

a 'devisee' is... in this strict sense, a recipient

of real property."51 However, said the court, emphasizing that a layman
and not an attorney had prepared the will, ". . . it seems unlikely and
artificial ... to impose on the testator's apparent intent a strict construc47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

169 N.E.2c 707 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
108 Ohio App. 567, 162 N.E.2d 897 (1957).
Id. at 569, 162 N.E.2d at 899.
165 N..2d 829 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
Id. at 832.
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tion of the word 'devisee', 52 as that term is used in the residuary clause
of the will. The proceeds of the residuary estate were ordered distributed
equally to the persons named in the nine specific items of the will.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Testator's widow objected to the action of the executor of testator's
estate in refusing to allow appraisers to set off to her, as widow, property
exempt from administration and an allowance for a year's support. At
issue, in the case of In re Estate of Weber,"3 was an oral antenuptial
agreement which, after marriage of the testator and his now surviving
spouse, was recited in a writing executed by the testator and his spouse.
Under the terms of the agreement, each party released the estate of the
other from all claims, including all rights or claims which each might
hold as widow or widower, respectively. The agreement stated that it
was executed "for the purpose of setting forth in writing the agreement
heretofore reached by the parties, verbally . . . ," and stated that such
verbal agreement had been made . . . prior to their... marriage .....

The widow argued that the asserted antenuptial agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Section 1335.05 of the Ohio Revised Code provides, in part, that "No action shall be brought whereby to
charge.., a person upon an agreement made upon consideration of marriage ... unless the agreement upon which such action is brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party

to be charged therewith.... ." (Emphasis added.) The widow, in urging
that the writing executed after marriage could not serve as a "memorandum" of the prior oral agreement, emphasized Ohio Revised Code section
3103.06, prohibiting contracts between husband and wife to alter their
legal relationship. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the writing in
this case did not constitute a new contract, subject to the prohibitions of
section 3103.06, but, rather, comprised a "memorandum" of an earlier
agreement of the parties, consummated prior to their marital union. The
"memorandum" nature of the written agreement was further held by
the supreme court to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, and
thus it barred the widow from any claim to a year's allowance or to exempt property from the estate of her deceased spouse. The Ohio Supreme
Court, by this decision, thus declares that a written memorandum of a
verbal antenuptial agreement, executed after marriage, will comprise a
sufficient "memorandum or note" of such agreement, as required under
the Ohio statute of frauds. A significant drafting point should be
52. Id. at 832.
53. 170 Ohio St. 567, 167 N.E.2d 98 (1960).
section, p. 512 supra.

See also discussion in Domestic Reltions

